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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SALT LAKE CITY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 930770-CA
(Priority 2)

THOMAS PARRISH,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Rule
26(2) (a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and by Utah Code
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(f). These sections allow a defendant in a circuit
court criminal action to take appeal from a final order for
anything other than a first degree or capital felony.

1

TEXT OF RELEVANT RULES

Utah Rule of Evidence 403 states:
Rule 403.
Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by consideration of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.
Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) states:
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct;
exceptions; other crimes.
...

(b) Other crimes, wrongs or acts. Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Utah Rule of Evidence 608(b) states:
Rule 608.

Evidence of character and conduct of witness.

•• •

(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of
conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or
supporting the witness7 credibility, other than conviction of
a crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by
extrinsic evidence. They may however, in the discretion of
the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be
inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1)
concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness, or
(2) concerning the character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which
character the witness being cross-examined has testified.

2

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

Is

defendant's

prior

conviction

for

disorderly

conduct

admissible under URE 404(b) for impeachment purposes?

II.

Is the defendant's prior conviction for disorderly conduct a

proper

subject

of

cross-examination

under

URE

608(b)

for

impeachment purposes?

III. Did the probative value of defendant's prior conviction
outweigh any unfair prejudice to the defendant?

IV.

Even if the admission of the prior conviction was error, was

it harmless?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Questions

concerning

the

admissibility

of

evidence

are

questions of law and are therefore reviewed for correctness. State
v. Reed, 820 P.2d 479 (Utah App. 1991).
When reviewing a trial court's balancing of the probative
value versus unfair prejudice of evidence, an appellate court will
only reverse if the trial court's decision was unreasonable as a
matter of law.

State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694 (Utah App. 1993).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The City is satisfied with the statement of the case as
offered by the defendant.
3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The City is satisfied with the statement of facts as offered
by the defendant.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Under URE 404(b), the prior conviction of the defendant is
admissible for impeachment purposes.

The conviction is also

admissible

provisions

under

URE

608(b).

Both

allow

prior

misconduct evidence or prior conviction evidence as impeachment of
a defendant's testimony.
The trial court acted reasonably in determining that the
probative value of the prior conviction outweighed the danger for
unfair

prejudice

in

allowing

its

admission

for

impeachment

purposes.
Additionally, even if it were error to admit the prior
conviction/ it \jas harmless error.

ARGUMENT

I.

The conviction of the defendant for disorderly conduct was

admissible under URE 404(b) for impeachment purposes.

As a general rule, evidence of prior acts of misconduct of an
accused are not admissible to show conformity with the prior acts.
4

URE 404(b).

Rule 404(b) does not exclude evidence unless it fits

an exception; rather it allows admission of relevant evidence other
than to show merely the general disposition of the defendant.
Additionally, if a defendant opens up the subject as to prior
incidents, it becomes subject to cross-examination and refutation
the same as any other evidence.

State v. Lopez, 626 P.2d 483

(1981), O'Neil. 848 P.2d 694 (Utah App. 1993).
In Lopez, the defendant was charged with second degree murder
for the death of an individual he had fought with outside a bar.
The testimony of the state's witness was that Lopez had kicked the
victim in the head while he lay on the ground, fracturing his skull
and resulting in his death. Defendant denied kicking the victim in
the head.

On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked about the

details of an earlier fight with a man named Waltz that led to the
incident with the defendant.

Specifically, the prosecutor asked

Lopez if he had kicked Waltz in the head.

The question raised an

objection by defense counsel, which was overruled, and Lopez
answered no. The state then presented a witness who testified that
she saw the defendant kick Waltz while he lay on the ground.
Defendant claimed the testimony about the earlier kick was in
violation of Rule 551 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
1

The Court

This rule has since been replaced with Rule 404(b) of the
Utah Rules of Evidence, patterned after the Federal Rule. Former
Rule 55 read:
Subject to Rule 47, evidence that a person committed a
crime or a civil wrong on a specified occasion, is
inadmissible to prove his disposition to commit crime or
civil wrong as the basis for an inference that he
committed another crime or civil wrong on another
specified occasion but, subject to Rule 45 and 48, such
5

rejected this claim.

In analyzing the applicable rules, the court

found that Lopez had opened up the subject of the prior fight and
that this allowed the state the opportunity to question Lopez about
the earlier incident.

The court also noted that, because the

state's witness and Lopez were in direct conflict with their
testimony about a kick to the victim's head, credibility was the
critical

question

in

the

case.

Given

this,

"there

is no

impropriety in receiving evidence bearing upon the credibility of
the witness."

Lopez at 486.

In the case presently before the court, as in Lopez, it was
the defendant's denial of certain evidence that opened the door to
the city's questioning concerning the prior incident.

On direct

examination, Parrish indicated that "he expected" to be arrested
and that it was "not the first time that's happened."
(T.) at p.19, line (1.) 16.

Transcript

On cross-examination, he indicated

that he'd been arrested three times in as many months, in response
to the question "why did you expect to be arrested."
I. 18,19.

Then, on re-direct examination, Counsel for Parrish

asked "at any time have you ever beaten your wife?".
II.

T. at p.20,

T at 21, 1.

Parrish denied he had.
The

denial

of

Parrish

on this

question

put

the

prior

conviction squarely in issue. In the exchange prior to the court's

evidence is admissible when relevant to prove some other
material fact including absence of mistake or accident,
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge
or identity.
The similarities between the Current 404 and former rule 55
are obvious.
6

ruling on the objection, the prosecutor clearly stated the evidence
was intended to show that Parrish had not been truthful with the
court.

T. at p. 22 1. 24,25.

As in Lopez, where the case turns on credibility of the
witnesses, such evidence is of great value to the trier of fact,
and clearly is admissible under URE 404(b), and Lopez.2

II.

The conviction of the defendant for disorderly conduct is

admissible under URE 608(b) for impeachment purposes.

Impeachment evidence is admissible under URE 608(b) if it goes
to credibility, even though it introduces evidence which would
otherwise be inadmissible.

Reed, 820 P.2d 479 (Utah App. 1991).

Parrish appears to concede this is the law on the subject in
his brief, but argues that the prior conviction is not impeaching,
and thus, not admissible.
This argument ignores the duty of the finder of fact to weigh
evidence and determine the value it should be given in reference to

2

Parrish argues that Lopez is distinguishable because the
evidence in Lopez was directly contrary to the defendant's
testimony, where in the case presently before the court, the
evidence is not directly in conflict.
The question of how compelling impeachment evidence is goes to
the weight to be accorded particular evidence, not the
admissibility of the evidence. Whether the trier of fact chooses
to accept the evidence as impeachment of the defendant is within
their province, but the rules clearly allow the prosecution the
opportunity to present such impeachment.
Defendant is not denied the opportunity to explain the
circumstances of the prior incident and to reduce the effect of the
impeaching testimony or questioning.
See also. Infra, Argument section II.
7

other evidence presented.
interpretations

does

Because evidence is subject to varying

not mean

it

is

inadmissible.

Parrish

correctly points out that a conviction for disorderly conduct could
cover a potentially large area of conduct, some of which would not
be impeaching.

But some of the prohibited conduct clearly could

cast doubt on Parrish's assertion that he had never beaten his
wife.
Parrish also argues that because the City presented no
evidence to indicate which type of behavior under the disorderly
conduct ordinance he was convicted of, the conviction itself is not
impeaching.

Under the plain terms of URE 608 (b) , the City was

precluded from presenting evidence of the type of conduct the
conviction was based on.

The rule clearly bars the use of

extrinsic evidence to prove the misconduct.3
to the answer Parrish gave on the question.

The City is limited
Parrish was still

allowed the opportunity to argue to the court the broad nature of
the statute or to testify as to the precise behavior the conviction
was based on.
Clearly, the question of the prior conviction's value as
impeachment evidence is a question of the weight of the evidence,
not the admissibility of it.

3

The City would not be allowed to use extrinsic evidence
to prove the kind of misconduct alleged, and thus, would be "stuck"
with the defendant's answer, unless of course the defendant
attempted to explain away the prior conviction or minimize its
import, in which case the City would be allowed to further probe
the details of the incident through extrinsic evidence. See State
v. Tucker. 800 P.2d 819 (Utah App. 1990).
8

III. The probative value of defendant's prior conviction for
disorderly conduct outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice and is
therefore admissible.

Even though evidence regarding a defendant's prior conviction
is admissible under 404(b), it must also meet the requirements of
Rule 403. O'Neil, 848 P.2d at 701.
In O'Neil the court noted several factors to be weighed in
determining the probative value of evidence as opposed to the
danger for unfair prejudice.

These include:

the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the
other crime, the similarities between the crimes, the
interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the
need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof,
and the degree to which the evidence will probably will
rouse the jury to overmastering hostility.
O'Neil at 701.
In assessing these factors in the case before them, the court
concluded that the trial court had acted reasonably in allowing the
prior conviction.

Specifically the court noted that a conviction

is the strongest evidence of a crime, that the prior crime and the
charged crime were very similar in nature, that three years has
passed from the prior conviction and thus the new charge was close
in time, and that although there was other evidence, the prior
conviction was not barred simply because the state had other
evidence.
Similarly, in Parrish's case, the evidence complained of is a
prior conviction based on similar events, a domestic dispute.
Also, the time between events was minimal, and much less than three
9

years.

Finally, and perhaps most important, Parrish's case was

tried to the bench.

Thus, there was no danger of overmastering

hostility from a jury.
In light of these factors, it is clear the trial court acted
reasonably in determining that the probative value of the evidence
outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice.

IV.

The

admission

of

the

defendant's

prior

conviction

was

harmless.

It is well-settled

law that an appellate court will not

reverse a decision of a trial court even where error exists if the
error is harmless.

Admission of prior bad acts is harmless where

there is no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result absent
the admission of the prior bad act.

State v. Feather stone. 781

P.2d 424 (Utah 1989).
In the case at hand, it is clear that the admission of the
prior conviction was harmless, as the trial judge did not even
consider it in his determination of the case.

In determining the

credibility of the witnesses the court focused on completely
separate portions of the testimony, not even considering whether or
not the prior conviction was impeaching, but determining the
defendant

was not

credible on a completely

involving other factual discrepancies.

different basis,

T. at p. 27,28.

Based on the very clear nature of the court's ruling, there is
no reasonable

likelihood

of a different
10

outcome without the

evidence of the prior conviction.

CONCLUSION

For any or all of the foregoing reasons, the City requests
that the decision of the trial court be affirmed and the appeal of
defendant denied.

Respectfully submitted this

day of May, 1994.

)D J.
ASSISTAN'
ATTORNEY

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Todd J. Godfrey, hereby certify that I have caused eight
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee to be delivered to the
Utah Court of Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East Salt
Lake City, Utah 84102, and four copies to Rebecca C. Hyde, Attorney
for Defendant/Appellant, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111, on this 7j£> day of May, 1994.
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ADDENDUM A
Utah Rule of Evidence 403

1

Utah Rule of Evidence 404

2

Utah Rule of Evidence 608

3

12
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UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may
add any other or further statement which shows the
character of the evidence, the form in which it was
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It
may direct the making of an offer in question and
answer form.
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings
shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to
prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested
to the jury by any means, such as making statements
or offers of proof or asking questions in the hearing of
the jury.
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes
taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial
rights although they were not brought to the attention of the court.
Rule 104. Preliminary questions.
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a
person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or
the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by
the court, subject to the provisions of Subdivision (b).
In making its determination it is not bound by the
rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the
relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of
a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or
subject to*, the introduction of evidence sufficient to
support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition.
(c) Hearing of jury. Hearings on the admissibility
of confessions shall in all cases be conducted out of
the hearing of the jury. Hearings on other preliminary matters shall be so conducted when the interests
of justice require, or when an accused is a witness and
so requests.
(d) Testimony by accused. The accused does not,
by testifying upon a preliminary matter, become subject to cross-examination as to other issues in the
case.
(e) Weight and credibility. This rule does not
limit the right of a party to introduce before the jury
evidence relevant to weight or credibility.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Rule 105. Limited admissibility.
When evidence which is admissible as to one party
or for one purpose but not admissible as to another
party or for another purpose is admitted, the court,
upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper
scope and instruct the jury accordingly.
Rule 106. Remainder of or related writings or
recorded statements.
When a writing or recorded statement or part
thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party
may require the introduction at that time of any
other part or any other writing or recorded statement
which ought in fairness to be considered contempora*
neously with it.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)

Rule 403

and ready determination by resort to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether requested or not.
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial
notice if requested by a party and supplied with the
necessary information.
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled
upon timely request to an opportunity to be heard as
to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor
of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request may be made after judicial notice
has been taken.
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be
taken at any stage of the proceeding.
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal case,
the court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not
required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially
noticed.
ARTICLE III. PRESUMPTIONS.
Rule 301. Presumptions in general in civil actions and proceedings.
(a) Effect. In all civil actions and proceedings not
otherwise provided for by statute or by these rules, a
presumption imposes on the party against whom it is
directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence
of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence.
(b) Inconsistent presumptions. If presumptions
are inconsistent, the presumption applies that is
founded upon weightier considerations of policy. If
considerations of policy are of equal weight neither
presumption applies.
Rule 302. Applicability of federal law in civil actions and proceedings.
In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a presumption respecting a fact which is an element of a
claim or defense as to which federal law supplies the
rule of decision is determined in accordance with federal law.
ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY AND ITS
LIMITS.
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence."
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.

ARTICLE II. JUDICIAL NOTICE.

Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United
States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in
courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is
not admissible.

Rule 201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts,
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial
notice of adjudicative facts.
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must
be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is
either (1) generally known within the territorial juw

Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on
grounds of prejudice, confusion, or
waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
miclonHinor thp inrv nr hv rnnsidpratinns of undue

Rule 404
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delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to
prove conduct; exceptions; other
crimes.
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a
person's character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused, or
by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to
rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of
peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the
victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the
character of a witness, as provided in Rules 607,
608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of
other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Rule 405. Methods of proving character.
(a) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which
evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as
to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into
relevant specific instances of conduct.
(b) Specific instances of conduct In cases in
which character or a trait of character of a person is
essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof
may also be made of specific instances of that person's
conduct.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Rule 406. Habit; routine practice.
Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine
practice of an organization, whether corroborated or
not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is
relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or
organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine practice.
Rule 407. Subsequent remedial measures.
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if
taken previously, would have made the event less
likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures
is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event. This rule does not
require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary
measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
Rule 408. Compromise and offers to compromise.
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising
to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to
accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or
attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissi-

704

its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made
in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of any
evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is
presented in the course of compromise negotiations.
This rule also does not require exclusion when the
evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
Rule 409. Payment of medical and similar expenses.
Evidence of furnishing or offering or promising to
pay medical, hospital, or similar expenses occasioned
by an injury is not admissible to prove liability for
the injury.
Rule 410. Inadmissibility of pleas, plea discussions, and related statements.
Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence
of the following is not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who made
the plea or was a participant in the plea discussions:
( l ) a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn;
(2) a plea of nolo contendere;
(3) any statement made in the course of any
proceedings under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure or comparable state procedure regarding either of the foregoing pleas; or
(4) any statement made in the course of plea
discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting
authority which do not result in a plea of guilty
or which result in a plea of guilty later withdrawn.
However, such a statement is admissible (i) in any
proceeding wherein another statement made in the
course of the same plea or plea discussions has been
introduced and the statement ought in fairness be
considered contemporaneously with it, or (ii) in a
criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement if
the statement was made by the defendant under oath,
on the record and in the presence of counsel.
Rule 411. Liability insurance.
Evidence that a person was or was not insured
against liability is not admissible upon the issue
whether the person acted negligently or otherwise
wrongfully. This rule does not require the exclusion
of evidence of insurance against liability when offered for another purpose, such as proof of agency,
ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Rule 412. [Reserved.]
ARTICLE V. PRIVILEGES.
Rule 501. Privileges recognized.
Except as provided in the Constitutions of the
United States and the State of Utah, no person shall
have a privilege to withhold evidence except as provided by these or other rules adopted by the Utah
Supreme Court or by existing statutory provisions
not in conflict with them.
(Amended effective April 15, 1992.)
Rule 502. Husband-wife.
(a) Criminal proceedings. In a criminal proceeding, a wife shall not be compelled to testify against
her husband, nor a husband against his wife.

Rule 607
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would be precluded from testifying be received for
these purposes.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Rule 607. Who may impeach.
The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any
party, including the party calling the witness.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Rule 608. Evidence of character and conduct of
witness.
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a witness may be attacked or
supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character
is admissible only after the character of the witness
for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of
attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other
than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may
not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of
truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on
cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the
witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness,
or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or
by any other witness, does not operate as a waiver of
the accused's or the witness' privilege against self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters
which relate only to credibility.
(c) Evidence of bias. Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be shown to impeach the
witness either by examination of the witness or by
evidence otherwise adduced.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime.
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the
credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of
one year under the law under which the witness
was convicted, and evidence that an accused has
been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted
if the court determines that the probative value
of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it involved
dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the
punishment.
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this
rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten
years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of
the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date,
unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a conviction more than ten years old as cal-
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notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the
adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest the
use of such evidence.
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate
of rehabilitation. Evidence of a conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has been
the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on a
finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted,
and that person has not been convicted of a subsequent crime which was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the conviction
has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other
equivalent procedure based on a finding of innocence.
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of juvenile
adjudications is generally not admissible under this
rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness
other than the accused if conviction of the offense
would be admissible to attack the credibility of an
adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.
(e) Pendency of appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not render evidence of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is admissible.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Rule 610. Religious beliefs or opinions.
Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on
matters of religion is not admissible for the purpose of
showing that by reason of their nature the witness'
credibility is impaired or enhanced.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Rule 611. Mode and order of interrogation and
presentation.
(a) Control by court. The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1)
make the interrogation and presentation effective for
the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.
(b) Scope of cross-examination. Cross-examination should be limited to the subject matter of the
direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The court may, in the exercise of
discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as
if on direct examination.
(c) Leading questions. Leading questions should
not be used on the direct examination of a witness
except as may be necessary to develop the witness'
testimony. Ordinarily leading questions should be
permitted on cross-examination. When a party calls a
hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party, interrogation may be by
leading questions.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Rule 612. Writing used to refresh memory.
If a witness uses a writing to refresh the witness'
memory for the purpose of testifying, either
(1) while testifying, or
(2) before testifying, if the court in its discretion determines it is necessary in the interests of
justice,
an adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing, to inspect it, to cross-examine
the witness thereon, and to introduce in evidence
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